An evolved cognitive bias for social norms
Rick O'Gorman
a,
⁎
, David Sloan Wilson
b,c
, Ralph R. Miller
d
a
Department of Psychology, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NP, UK
b
Department of Biological Sciences, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA
c
Department of Anthropology, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA
d
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA
Initial receipt 27 October 2006; final revision received 18 July 2007
Abstract
Social norms are a widely used concept for explaining human behavior, but there are few studies exploring how we cognitively utilize
them. We incorporate here an evolutionary approach to studying social norms, predicting that if norms have been critical to biological fitness,
then individuals should have adaptive mechanisms to conform to, and avoid violating, norms. A cognitive bias toward norms is one specific
means by which individuals could achieve this. To test this, we assessed whether individuals have greater recall for normative information
than for nonnormative information. Three experiments were performed in which participants read a text and were then tested on their recall of
behavioral content. The data suggest that individuals have superior recall for normative social information and that performance is not related
to rated importance. We discuss how such a cognitive bias may ontogenetically develop and identify possible hypotheses that distinguish
between alternative explanatory accounts for social norms.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Social norms; Social influence; Recall bias; Conformism; Cooperation
1. Introduction
The social life of humans is guided by social norms.
These cultural rules shape and structure our daily behaviors,
guiding much of what we do and do not do by prescribing
what behavior is acceptable (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Yet
despite their widespread use in psychological theories (e.g.,
Hechter & Opp, 2001), the functions of normative behavior
are not empirically well established from either an evolu-
tionary or a proximate perspective and have tended to be
taken for granted as a social phenomenon. Of course, some
social patterns of behavior that are labeled as social norms
may not be learned behaviors at all (e.g., incest avoidance),
but a vast array of social patterns of behavior are self-
evidently learned.
There are a number of theoretical models that may
account for the functions of social norms that we can outline
briefly here. One simple account of social norms is that they
are the result of social learning (Bandura, 1977), with some
behaviors becoming particularly prevalent in a population,
perhaps due to, in some sense, a “tipping-point” effect
(Gladwell, 2000) in which their distributions are curtailed
only by group boundaries. A slightly varied version of this
model views some norms as a result of a corresponding
meme (Dawkins, 1976). Alternatively, “normative confor-
mity” (Henrich, 2004) may have an ancient phylogenetic
history; many gregarious animal species demonstrate a
simple version of conforming behavior, “following the herd”
to avoid exposure to predators (Hamilton, 1971). However,
people's responses to social norms, violations of norms, and
changes in norms suggest that norms are not due solely to
incidental group boundaries or selfish herds, although these
may play a role.
A second more sophisticated account of norms suggests
that they may result from an evolved strategy to avoid the
costs of individual learning: If successful behaviors tend to
become widespread, then adopting widespread behaviors
should tend to result in the acquisition of beneficial beha-
viors (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Furthermore, Richerson
and Boyd (2005) have argued that a conformism bias can
Evolution and Human Behavior 29 (2008) 71 – 78
⁎
Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1227 827374; fax: +44 1227 827030.
E-mail address: rogorman@alumni.binghamton.edu (R. O'Gorman).
1090-5138/$ – see front matter © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.07.002