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Silver and Gold: The Political Economy of International Monetary Conferences, 1867-1892

Silver and Gold: The Political Economy of International Monetary Conferences, 1867-1892 Book Reviews tion game, in which countries recognize the losses that would follow from opting out of the system and thus remain in the system while attempting to shape it to their advantage. By documenting the political forces shaping the positions adopted by individual governments, the arguments put forth by national representatives during the conferences, and the domestic political fallout resulting from the conferences, Reti sheds a great deal of light on the nature of the process that generated and sustained the gold standard. His detailed presentation of the political economy of the era leaves little doubt that the coordination-game theory provides the most reasonable explanation of the rise and survival of the regime. Extensive documentation is both the book’s greatest strength and its greatest weakness. At times the book is repetitive, and Reti’s writing style is merely workmanlike. But lack of style detracts little from the important contribution to our understanding of the political economy of the gold standard made by the book. Neil T. Skaggs, Illinois State University http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Political Economy Duke University Press

Silver and Gold: The Political Economy of International Monetary Conferences, 1867-1892

Skaggs, Neil T.
History of Political Economy , Volume 32 (1) – Mar 1, 2000
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Publisher
Duke University Press
Copyright
Copyright 2000 by Duke University Press
ISSN
0018-2702
eISSN
1527-1919
DOI
10.1215/00182702-32-1-177
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Book Reviews tion game, in which countries recognize the losses that would follow from opting out of the system and thus remain in the system while attempting to shape it to their advantage. By documenting the political forces shaping the positions adopted by individual governments, the arguments put forth by national representatives during the conferences, and the domestic political fallout resulting from the conferences, Reti sheds a great deal of light on the nature of the process that generated and sustained the gold standard. His detailed presentation of the political economy of the era leaves little doubt that the coordination-game theory provides the most reasonable explanation of the rise and survival of the regime. Extensive documentation is both the book’s greatest strength and its greatest weakness. At times the book is repetitive, and Reti’s writing style is merely workmanlike. But lack of style detracts little from the important contribution to our understanding of the political economy of the gold standard made by the book. Neil T. Skaggs, Illinois State University

Journal

History of Political Economy – Duke University Press

Published: Mar 1, 2000

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