Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach

Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach The reform of bank supervision represents a significant institutional challenge for the European Union. This paper explores the merits of a choice-oriented approach under which individual Member states have the option to delegate prudential supervision of their largest banks to the European Central Bank, while retaining the right to re-assume such a role at a later date. Responsibilities, commitments and costs would be allocated by means of a binding arrangement with the ECB that can be tailored to Member states' specific circumstances. The proposal offered here is superior to both existing supervisory arrangements and proposed alternatives. Its adoption would also significantly reinforce the new, post financial crisis EU supervisory architecture. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png European Company and Financial Law Review de Gruyter

Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach

Loading next page...
 
/lp/de-gruyter/empowering-the-ecb-to-supervise-banks-a-choice-based-approach-WEBc2edM4t

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© Copyright 2010 by the European Company and Financial Law Review (ECFR)
Subject
ECFR Symposium, The Haque, October 2, 2009, Part 1: “The Financial Crisis”
ISSN
1613-2548
eISSN
1613-2556
DOI
10.1515/ECFR.2010.171
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The reform of bank supervision represents a significant institutional challenge for the European Union. This paper explores the merits of a choice-oriented approach under which individual Member states have the option to delegate prudential supervision of their largest banks to the European Central Bank, while retaining the right to re-assume such a role at a later date. Responsibilities, commitments and costs would be allocated by means of a binding arrangement with the ECB that can be tailored to Member states' specific circumstances. The proposal offered here is superior to both existing supervisory arrangements and proposed alternatives. Its adoption would also significantly reinforce the new, post financial crisis EU supervisory architecture.

Journal

European Company and Financial Law Reviewde Gruyter

Published: Jul 1, 2010

There are no references for this article.