Searching for the Possibility Impossibility Border of Truthful Mechanism Design RON LAVI Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, The Technion, Israel One of the rst results to merge auction theory and algorithmic theory, [Lehmann et al. 2002], considers a combinatorial auction setting, and describes a computationally e cient and truthful auction for single-minded players, i.e. players that desire only one speci c subset of items. The natural continuation would have been the case of multi-minded players. Indeed, the literature has managed to extend the results to the more general cases, by using randomness (e.g. [Lavi and Swamy 2005; Dobzinski et al. 2006]). However, in the deterministic case, virtually no positive advancement was made ever since.1 An even worse state of a airs exists in the algorithmic domain of job scheduling. The seminal paper on algorithmic mechanism design [Nisan and Ronen 2001] describes a basic impossibility for the multi-dimensional version of the problem, while [Archer and Tardos 2001] observe the possibility in the single-dimensional case. Here, the situation is even worse, as the transition from the possibility to the impossibility does not depend on any computational assumptions, and since we do not even know if randomness can
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