On Optimal Multidimensional Mechanism Design YANG CAI, CONSTANTINOS DASKALAKIS and S. MATTHEW WEINBERG Massachusetts Institute of Technology We solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the rst setting, we need that the values of each bidder for the items are i.i.d., but allow di erent distributions for each bidder. In the second setting, we allow the values of each bidder for the items to be arbitrarily correlated, but assume that the bidders are i.i.d. For all > 0, we obtain an e cient additive -approximation, when the value distributions are bounded, or a multiplicative (1 )-approximation when the value distributions are unbounded, but satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate condition. When there is a single bidder, we generalize these results to independent but not necessarily identically distributed value distributions, and to independent regular distributions. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.2 [Theory of Computation]: Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Mechanism Design Additional Key Words and Phrases: Optimal Multidimensional Mechanism Design Introduction. In his seminal paper, Myerson [1981] studies the following auction design problem. A seller has a single
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On optimal multidimensional mechanism design
Cai, Yang; Daskalakis, Constantinos; Weinberg, S. Matthew
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, Volume 10 (2)
Association for Computing Machinery – Jun 1, 2011
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