Leading Dynamics to Good Behavior MARIA FLORINA BALCAN Georgia Institute of Technology In this note we report recent results on the problem of leading natural dynamics to good behavior in games that have both high-quality and low-quality equilibria. We show how a central agency can use a public-service advertising campaign to help nudge players behavior towards a high-quality equilibrium, even if only a fraction of players pay attention. We also discuss results analyzing how well-motivated learning rules, when given additional global information about a game, can be used to e ectively reach high-quality equilibria. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: General General Terms: Algorithms, Theory, Economics Additional Key Words and Phrases: game theory, dynamics, learning, equilibrium quality 1. INTRODUCTION One major focus of algorithmic game theory has been analyzing the quality of Nash equilibria in a game, in order to understand the additional cost incurred when we assume that agents are behaving in a strategic manner, rather than performing a global optimization. This focus was initiated by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] who proposed the notion of Price of Anarchy (PoA) of a game, which is the ratio of
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