Joint Review1 of Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools Cambridge University Press by O. Goldreich and Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols by P. Ryan and S. Schneider Addison Wesley Review by Riccardo Pucella Department of Computer Science Cornell University Introduction There are essentially two schools, advocating two general approaches to the problem of reasoning about the security properties of a system. What do I mean by a security property? Examples of these include secrecy (ensuring that only authorized parties get access to a piece of information), integrity (ensuring that messages exchanged between parties are not modi ed in transit), and authenticity (ensuring that parties can ascertain the origin of messages). Reasoning about the security of a system basically means guring out whether the security properties of interest hold in the presence of an adversary that attempts to attack the system by manipulating the environment in which the system executes. For instance, the adversary may intercept, modify, and redirect messages, may pose as di erent parties, etc. In order to prevent the adversary from successfully attacking the system (and thereby access secret information, or corrupting messages without any party noticing, depending on what the security property is guaranteeing should
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