Joseph S. Fulda, CSE, PhD WATC H 701 W'bst177th Street #21, New ~rk, IVY 10033 ~@ao~.ors"h~.'//www.cd~,o~/~ight.h~l Copyrzght © 1999, Joseph X Fulda How Does Formal Logic Fare as a Model of Legal Argumentation? n "Argument in Artificial Intelligence and Law," [1] Trevor Bench-Capon reviews the various strands of AI research into how best to model legal argumentation. Following this survey, he attempts to impose a taxonomy on the various research efforts. What interests us here, however, is what takes up the bulk of this paper, a long, discursive aside on the appropriateness of logic as a model of legal argument. In this intriguing paper, Bench-Capon distinguishes between logic and argument, finding the former a narrow and formal mechanism not particularly good for modelling the latter. In particular, Bench-Capon believes the usual premisesto-conclusion view much too simple for the arguments of a domain such as the law. More promising is Toulmin's approach which has proved fruitful for many AI and law projects using data-so-(modal qualifier)-daim, with "so" backed up by warrant-from-backing and "claim" subject to rebuttal. Bench-Capon's critidsms of logic are several: He argues that logic lacks the elements of rhetoric, procedure, and context, features that are critical to
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