Ex-Post Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions MOSHE TENNENHOLTZ Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management Technion Israel Institute of Technology Given a game with incomplete information, such as a combinatorial auction, one may ask what is a good solution concept for (or predictor for players behaviors in) such a game. Most of the literature on combinatorial auctions appeals to a nonBayesian setting, and to the concept of dominant strategy implementation. A nice property of a dominant strategy for a given game is its uniqueness. However, this nice property and the natural appeal of dominant strategies might be misleading. In a general non-Bayesian setting, one can de ne the natural solution concept of ex-post equilibrium. Roughly speaking, an ex-post equilibrium is a strategy pro le in which unilateral deviations are not bene cial regardless of the state of nature. Notice that in di erence to a dominant strategy, where arbitrary behaviors of the other players are considered, in an ex-post equilibrium only other players behaviors which conform to the prescribed strategy pro le are considered. From a purely economic mechanism design perspective one may be tempted to ignore ex-post equilibria: The revelation principle implies that, in a private
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Ex-post equilibria in combinatorial auctions
Tennenholtz, Moshe
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, Volume 7 (1)
Association for Computing Machinery – Dec 1, 2007
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