Cooperation and Contagion in Web-Based, Networked Public Goods Experiments SIDDHARTH SURI and DUNCAN J. WATTS Yahoo! Research A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of ve network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In contrast with previous work, we found that network topology had no signi cant e ect on average contributions. This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not bene t from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which arti cial seed players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that although players did generally behave like conditional cooperators, they were as
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