An Architecture A Day Keeps The Hacker Away David A. Holland, Ada T. Lim, and Margo I. Seltzer Harvard University {dholland,ada,margo}@eecs.harvard.edu September 15, 2004 Abstract System security as it is practiced today is a losing battle. In this paper, we outline a possible comprehensive solution for binary-based attacks, using virtual machines, machine descriptions, and randomization to achieve broad heterogeneity at the machine level. This heterogeneity increases the cost of broad-based binary attacks to a suf ciently high level that they cease to become feasible. The convergence of several recent technologies appears to make our approach achievable at a reasonable cost, with only moderate run-time overhead. patch machines individually or in small groups, at a huge disadvantage. Some techniques have been developed to block whole classes of attacks: for example, StackGuard [5] effectively prevents a certain type of bufferbased attack; the more recent PointGuard [4] protects against a wider range of such attacks. Recent work in shepherded execution [10] has the potential to stop code-injection attacks and many ow-of-control attacks. However, most of these tools are quite speci c in nature, and in many cases they amount to an arms race between exploit writers and security tool developers,
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