A Competitive Strategy for Routing Flow over Time UMANG BHASKAR Dartmouth College and LISA FLEISCHER Dartmouth College and ELLIOT ANSHELEVICH Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Network routing games are used to understand the impact of individual users decisions on network e ciency. Prior work on routing games uses a simpli ed model of network ow where all ow exists simultaneously. In our work, we examine routing games in a ow-over-time model. We show that by reducing network capacity judiciously, the network owner can ensure that the equilibrium is no worse than a small constant times the optimal in the original network, for two natural measures of optimality. These are the rst upper bounds on the price of anarchy in the ow-over-time model for general networks. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Algorithms, Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: routing games, price of anarchy, ow-over-time 1. INTRODUCTION We are interested in understanding the behavior of tra c in large networks, such as the Internet and road networks. There are two common features of tra c in these networks. (1) Tra c travels over time. Thus, the state of these networks is a function
/lp/association-for-computing-machinery/a-competitive-strategy-for-routing-flow-over-time-Nm0OtvEvyt