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Individual versus Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Growth

Individual versus Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource... By LENA EDLUND AND ¨ NILS-PETTER LAGERLOF* It is noteworthy that explicit bride-price has been absent from individual consent regimes; one reason may be that when the bride is the recipient, there is less need for a lump sum payment. Instead, the bride-price may be implicit in the form of a higher level of consumion in marriage and widowhood (advantageous in the face of credit constraints). It is perhaps not surprising that the nuclear family, which affords higher status to the young bride (who is the spouse of the head of household rather than his dauger-in-law), holds a prominent place in Europe, while in Asia, the extended family has been the prescribed form.1 A similar argument underlies our contention that young men gain from individual consent. Under parental consent, the old can order the young to marry and, thus, a father need only purchase a dauger-in-law for his son. Under individual consent, the decision to marry lies with the son and, hence, the father will have to induce the son to marry. The son wants to marry, but also values consumion in old age. Since the latter is determined by his own son’s productivity, he will not only http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Review American Economic Association

Individual versus Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Growth

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Papers
ISSN
0002-8282
DOI
10.1257/000282806777212477
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

By LENA EDLUND AND ¨ NILS-PETTER LAGERLOF* It is noteworthy that explicit bride-price has been absent from individual consent regimes; one reason may be that when the bride is the recipient, there is less need for a lump sum payment. Instead, the bride-price may be implicit in the form of a higher level of consumion in marriage and widowhood (advantageous in the face of credit constraints). It is perhaps not surprising that the nuclear family, which affords higher status to the young bride (who is the spouse of the head of household rather than his dauger-in-law), holds a prominent place in Europe, while in Asia, the extended family has been the prescribed form.1 A similar argument underlies our contention that young men gain from individual consent. Under parental consent, the old can order the young to marry and, thus, a father need only purchase a dauger-in-law for his son. Under individual consent, the decision to marry lies with the son and, hence, the father will have to induce the son to marry. The son wants to marry, but also values consumion in old age. Since the latter is determined by his own son’s productivity, he will not only

Journal

American Economic Review – American Economic Association

Published: May 1, 2006

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