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COMMENT ON CLAUDIA BLÖSER “THE DEFEASIBLE STRUCTURE OF ASCRIPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY”

COMMENT ON CLAUDIA BLÖSER “THE DEFEASIBLE STRUCTURE OF ASCRIPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY” Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 (2013), 151­155. COMMENT ON CLAUDIA BLÖSER "THE DEFEASIBLE STRUCTURE OF ASCRIPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY" R. Jay WALLACE University of California, Berkeley Claudia Blöser's interesting paper defends the idea that moral and legal responsibility exhibit a defeasible structure. Ascriptions of responsibility to agents are ordinarily justi ed by default, as long as certain basic conditions are satis ed. But there are further conditions, compatible with the satisfaction of the default standards, that provide a legitimate basis for challenging these ascriptions in particular cases. is "default-and-challenge" structure, Blöser maintains, is essential to the practices of moral and legal accountability. Her aim in the paper is to defend the thesis that responsibility is in this way a defeasible concept, and then to show how attention to the default-and-challenge structure of these practices can help to illuminate hitherto obscure features of them. ere is much that I nd convincing in Blöser's treatment of these issues. But I also have a few questions about her account. In my brief remarks, I shall focus on the issue of how exactly the default-and-challenge structure is meant to apply to the cases of moral and legal responsibility; I shall turn at the end http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

COMMENT ON CLAUDIA BLÖSER “THE DEFEASIBLE STRUCTURE OF ASCRIPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY”

WALLACE, R. Jay
Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 87 (1): 151 – Jan 1, 2013
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/9789401210119_009
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 (2013), 151­155. COMMENT ON CLAUDIA BLÖSER "THE DEFEASIBLE STRUCTURE OF ASCRIPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY" R. Jay WALLACE University of California, Berkeley Claudia Blöser's interesting paper defends the idea that moral and legal responsibility exhibit a defeasible structure. Ascriptions of responsibility to agents are ordinarily justi ed by default, as long as certain basic conditions are satis ed. But there are further conditions, compatible with the satisfaction of the default standards, that provide a legitimate basis for challenging these ascriptions in particular cases. is "default-and-challenge" structure, Blöser maintains, is essential to the practices of moral and legal accountability. Her aim in the paper is to defend the thesis that responsibility is in this way a defeasible concept, and then to show how attention to the default-and-challenge structure of these practices can help to illuminate hitherto obscure features of them. ere is much that I nd convincing in Blöser's treatment of these issues. But I also have a few questions about her account. In my brief remarks, I shall focus on the issue of how exactly the default-and-challenge structure is meant to apply to the cases of moral and legal responsibility; I shall turn at the end

Journal

Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2013

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