Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/brill/knowledge-ascriptivism-and-defeasible-concepts-zHLHezKpuw
References
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 0165-9227
- eISSN
- 1875-6735
- DOI
- 10.1163/9789401210119_003
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 (2013), 936. KNOWLEDGE, ASCRIPTIVISM AND DEFEASIBLE CONCEPTS Michael WILLIAMS Johns Hopkins University Summary In " e Ascription of Responsibilities and Rights," H. L. A. Hart introduces two ideas, which he takes to be importantly related: ascriptive sentences and defeasible concepts. Hart's purpose is to dispel certain confusions that he nds in the philosophy of action; but I argue that Hart's ideas are equally pertinent to epistemology. Knowledge is a matter of epistemic authority; and authority is a matter of rights and responsibilities. But Hart's "ascriptivism" has attracted serious criticism and stands in need of clari cation, elaboration and even correction. e overall aim of the paper is to present a form of epistemic ascriptivism, in which justi cation emerges as a defeasible concept in Hart's sense. Introduction In his seminal paper, " e Ascription of Responsibilities and Rights," H. L. A. Hart attempts to dispel the confusion that he nds in the philosophy of action. (Hart 1948-49) Hart traces the confusion to a failure to appreciate the semantic character of certain sentences and concepts. First, the real function of sentences that seem to describe an act as voluntary is to ascribe responsibility to the
Journal
Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2013