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FREGE’S USE OF FUNCTION-ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND HIS INTRODUCTION OF TRUTH-VALUES AS OBJECTS

FREGE’S USE OF FUNCTION-ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND HIS INTRODUCTION OF TRUTH-VALUES AS OBJECTS Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (2007), 93­123. FREGE'S USE OF FUNCTIONARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND HIS INTRODUCTION OF TRUTHVALUES AS OBJECTS Michael BEANEY University of York Summary One of Frege's most characteristic ideas is his conception of truth-values as objects. On his account (from 1891 onwards), concepts are functions that map objects onto one of the two truth-values, the True and the False. These two truth-values are also seen as objects, an implication of Frege's sharp distinction between objects and functions. Crucial to this account is his use of functionargument analysis, and in this paper I explore the relationship between this use and his introduction of truth-values as objects. In the first section I look at Frege's use of function-argument analysis in his first work, the Begriffsschrift, and stress the importance of the idea that such a use permits alternative analyses. In the second section I examine his early notion of conceptual content, and argue that there is a problem in understanding that notion once alternative analyses are allowed. In the third section I turn to his key 1891 paper, `Function and Concept', where the idea of truth-values as objects first appears, and consider its motivation. In the concluding section I http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

FREGE’S USE OF FUNCTION-ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND HIS INTRODUCTION OF TRUTH-VALUES AS OBJECTS

BEANEY, Michael
Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 75 (1): 93 – Jan 1, 2007
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/9789401204026_005
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (2007), 93­123. FREGE'S USE OF FUNCTIONARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND HIS INTRODUCTION OF TRUTHVALUES AS OBJECTS Michael BEANEY University of York Summary One of Frege's most characteristic ideas is his conception of truth-values as objects. On his account (from 1891 onwards), concepts are functions that map objects onto one of the two truth-values, the True and the False. These two truth-values are also seen as objects, an implication of Frege's sharp distinction between objects and functions. Crucial to this account is his use of functionargument analysis, and in this paper I explore the relationship between this use and his introduction of truth-values as objects. In the first section I look at Frege's use of function-argument analysis in his first work, the Begriffsschrift, and stress the importance of the idea that such a use permits alternative analyses. In the second section I examine his early notion of conceptual content, and argue that there is a problem in understanding that notion once alternative analyses are allowed. In the third section I turn to his key 1891 paper, `Function and Concept', where the idea of truth-values as objects first appears, and consider its motivation. In the concluding section I

Journal

Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2007

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