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SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION

SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION Danish Yearbook 0/ Philosophy, Vol. 34 (1999), 25-42 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION ALEXANDER BIRD University of Edinburgh Are scientific revolutions rational? Thomas Kuhn gave us adescription of scientific change in which periods of normal science are interrupted by scientific revolutions, where the paradigms governing normal science are overthrown and new ones instituted. In this pa­ per I shall assume that something like this does indeed happen. The question I shall seek to answer is this: Is such a picture consistent with regarding science as rational? By and large, the standard answer to the question has been, No. There are a number of reasons for this. First, both opponents, notably Popper and Lakatos, and (some) defenders, such as the proponents of the Strong Pro­ gram, have taken it to be so. Secondly, Kuhn himself does give the impression that during normal science rationality is relative to the governing paradigm and that during a revolution the choice of a new paradigm is governed by non­ rational forces (politics, propaganda, personalities, power etc.). Thirdly, it has generally been assumed that if science were rational, then its development would be smooth and regular, not jerky as the normal science http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Danish Yearbook of Philosophy Brill

SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy , Volume 34 (1): 18 – Aug 2, 1999

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0070-2749
eISSN
2468-9300
DOI
10.1163/24689300_0340103
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Danish Yearbook 0/ Philosophy, Vol. 34 (1999), 25-42 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION ALEXANDER BIRD University of Edinburgh Are scientific revolutions rational? Thomas Kuhn gave us adescription of scientific change in which periods of normal science are interrupted by scientific revolutions, where the paradigms governing normal science are overthrown and new ones instituted. In this pa­ per I shall assume that something like this does indeed happen. The question I shall seek to answer is this: Is such a picture consistent with regarding science as rational? By and large, the standard answer to the question has been, No. There are a number of reasons for this. First, both opponents, notably Popper and Lakatos, and (some) defenders, such as the proponents of the Strong Pro­ gram, have taken it to be so. Secondly, Kuhn himself does give the impression that during normal science rationality is relative to the governing paradigm and that during a revolution the choice of a new paradigm is governed by non­ rational forces (politics, propaganda, personalities, power etc.). Thirdly, it has generally been assumed that if science were rational, then its development would be smooth and regular, not jerky as the normal science

Journal

Danish Yearbook of PhilosophyBrill

Published: Aug 2, 1999

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