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A REPLY TO LÜBCKE AND COLLIN

A REPLY TO LÜBCKE AND COLLIN Danish Yearbook o[ Philosophy, Vol. 25 (1990), 89-105 ERICH KLAWONN University of Odense The first, and most important point made by Lübcke and Collin that I wish to comment upon, is their criticism of my attempts to illustrate the difference between 'being myself' and 'being somebody else' by means of thought- experiments. In my main example: 'teletransportation-with-a-failure', two persons are created who seem equally qualified to being one and the same original per- son, as far as their physical and mental properties (e.g. their ability to re- member the original person's past, etc.) are concerned. I argue that, though it seems impossible to tell which one of the two persons - the man in Copenhagen or the man in Mallorca - is identical with the original person, if a third person point of view is applied, the situation is quite different seen from a first person point of view. It seems obvious that I can imagine myself being the man in Copenhagen or the man in Mallorca, and that - phenomenologically - there is a difference between imagining the one thing and imagining the other, even though all other properties of the two persons are supposed to remain the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Danish Yearbook of Philosophy Brill

A REPLY TO LÜBCKE AND COLLIN

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy , Volume 25 (1): 17 – Aug 2, 1990

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0070-2749
eISSN
2468-9300
DOI
10.1163/24689300_0250107
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Danish Yearbook o[ Philosophy, Vol. 25 (1990), 89-105 ERICH KLAWONN University of Odense The first, and most important point made by Lübcke and Collin that I wish to comment upon, is their criticism of my attempts to illustrate the difference between 'being myself' and 'being somebody else' by means of thought- experiments. In my main example: 'teletransportation-with-a-failure', two persons are created who seem equally qualified to being one and the same original per- son, as far as their physical and mental properties (e.g. their ability to re- member the original person's past, etc.) are concerned. I argue that, though it seems impossible to tell which one of the two persons - the man in Copenhagen or the man in Mallorca - is identical with the original person, if a third person point of view is applied, the situation is quite different seen from a first person point of view. It seems obvious that I can imagine myself being the man in Copenhagen or the man in Mallorca, and that - phenomenologically - there is a difference between imagining the one thing and imagining the other, even though all other properties of the two persons are supposed to remain the

Journal

Danish Yearbook of PhilosophyBrill

Published: Aug 2, 1990

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