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PARFIT ON NEUTRALITY

PARFIT ON NEUTRALITY Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Vol. 25 (1990), 61-72 INGMAR PERSSON Lund University I. Introduction A theme running through the first three parts of Derek Parfit's monumental book, Reasons and PersonsI, is the criticism of the self-interest theory, S. Its central claim is that there is one supreme rational aim: that one's own life go, for oneself, as weIl as possible (p. 4). How the notion of things going weIl for somebody is to be understood is of course controversial. I shall here avoid any assumptions about there being objective values. Instead I shall take it for granted that the notion should be explicated by reference to the fulfilment of desires of the subject. The details of such an explication must he re be left anspecified. Parfit highlights two aspects of S. One is its partiality in personal matters. Each being is to have a bias towards itself: it should be governed by an aim to make things go, for itself, as weIl as possible or, in other words, to maximize the fulfilment of its own desires . The second aspect is a temporal neutrality within these confines: one's master aim should be that things go, for oneself, as weIl http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY Brill

PARFIT ON NEUTRALITY

DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY , Volume 25 (1): 12 – Feb 1, 1822

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0070-2749
DOI
10.1163/24689300-90000005
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Vol. 25 (1990), 61-72 INGMAR PERSSON Lund University I. Introduction A theme running through the first three parts of Derek Parfit's monumental book, Reasons and PersonsI, is the criticism of the self-interest theory, S. Its central claim is that there is one supreme rational aim: that one's own life go, for oneself, as weIl as possible (p. 4). How the notion of things going weIl for somebody is to be understood is of course controversial. I shall here avoid any assumptions about there being objective values. Instead I shall take it for granted that the notion should be explicated by reference to the fulfilment of desires of the subject. The details of such an explication must he re be left anspecified. Parfit highlights two aspects of S. One is its partiality in personal matters. Each being is to have a bias towards itself: it should be governed by an aim to make things go, for itself, as weIl as possible or, in other words, to maximize the fulfilment of its own desires . The second aspect is a temporal neutrality within these confines: one's master aim should be that things go, for oneself, as weIl

Journal

DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHYBrill

Published: Feb 1, 1822

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