Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Vol. 25 (1990), 61-72 INGMAR PERSSON Lund University I. Introduction A theme running through the first three parts of Derek Parfit's monumental book, Reasons and PersonsI, is the criticism of the self-interest theory, S. Its central claim is that there is one supreme rational aim: that one's own life go, for oneself, as weIl as possible (p. 4). How the notion of things going weIl for somebody is to be understood is of course controversial. I shall here avoid any assumptions about there being objective values. Instead I shall take it for granted that the notion should be explicated by reference to the fulfilment of desires of the subject. The details of such an explication must he re be left anspecified. Parfit highlights two aspects of S. One is its partiality in personal matters. Each being is to have a bias towards itself: it should be governed by an aim to make things go, for itself, as weIl as possible or, in other words, to maximize the fulfilment of its own desires . The second aspect is a temporal neutrality within these confines: one's master aim should be that things go, for oneself, as weIl
DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY – Brill
Published: Feb 1, 1822
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.