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Ethical Reflection and the Shaping of Character: Plato's Republic and Stoicism

Ethical Reflection and the Shaping of Character: Plato's Republic and Stoicism I. Introduction In this article I explore a striking, and perhaps paradoxical, feature of Greek ethical thought. This is that, in at least two areas of Greek philosophy (Plato's Republic and Stoicism), a complex and credible model of ethical development is combined with an ideal type of character which is often seen as hopelessly unrealistic, and perhaps positively repellent: the ideal which the Stoics call apatheia, or 'absence of passion.' By examining certain aspects of Platonic and Stoic thinking, I aim to bring out both the credibility of their model of ethical development and also the plausibility of the idea that this development might lead to a form of apatheia that is not wholly repellent. The model of ethical development, in broad outline, is a two-stage one: first, the development of pre-reflective virtue, through an upbringing and participation in interpersonal and communal relationships; then that of post-reflective virtue, through systematic ethical debate or dialectic, a form of virtue based on, but deepening or modifying, pre-reflective virtue.1 This model can be subdivided into two versions. The first is represented by Aristotle's ethical writings, especially the Nicomachean Ethics, and Stoic theory, at least in one prevalent pattern? In this version, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online Brill

Ethical Reflection and the Shaping of Character: Plato's Republic and Stoicism

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright 1998 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1059-986X
eISSN
2213-4417
DOI
10.1163/2213441796X00137
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

I. Introduction In this article I explore a striking, and perhaps paradoxical, feature of Greek ethical thought. This is that, in at least two areas of Greek philosophy (Plato's Republic and Stoicism), a complex and credible model of ethical development is combined with an ideal type of character which is often seen as hopelessly unrealistic, and perhaps positively repellent: the ideal which the Stoics call apatheia, or 'absence of passion.' By examining certain aspects of Platonic and Stoic thinking, I aim to bring out both the credibility of their model of ethical development and also the plausibility of the idea that this development might lead to a form of apatheia that is not wholly repellent. The model of ethical development, in broad outline, is a two-stage one: first, the development of pre-reflective virtue, through an upbringing and participation in interpersonal and communal relationships; then that of post-reflective virtue, through systematic ethical debate or dialectic, a form of virtue based on, but deepening or modifying, pre-reflective virtue.1 This model can be subdivided into two versions. The first is represented by Aristotle's ethical writings, especially the Nicomachean Ethics, and Stoic theory, at least in one prevalent pattern? In this version,

Journal

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1996

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