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Colloquium 5

Colloquium 5 I. The Rhetoric is a mine of information for Aristotle's phronimos and statesman. Seeing how arguments persuade is a window into the soul. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that the moral virtues are neither by nature nor contrary to nature. If what is natural were unchanging, then that dictum would have a simple meaning. It is by nature that we fear things that appear ready to do us harm, and contrary to nature to fear nothing or to be afraid of trivial events. The moral virtues involve fearing the right things for the right reasons in the right circumstances. Such fear is neither by nature nor contrary to nature. Of the three things in the soul in Nicomachean Ethics 11.5, passions and faculties (dynameis) are natural while hexeis, including the virtues and vices, are ethical.1 Because they are natural, the pas- sions and faculties are exempt from praise and blame? But what is natural changes over time, and what is natural to an individual depends in part on the accumulation of practical experience. It is plausible to suggest a parallel to Aristotle's dic- tum in Ethics IL1 and say that moral development is neither natu- ral nor http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online Brill

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright 1996 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1059-986X
eISSN
2213-4417
DOI
10.1163/2213441794X00102
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

I. The Rhetoric is a mine of information for Aristotle's phronimos and statesman. Seeing how arguments persuade is a window into the soul. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that the moral virtues are neither by nature nor contrary to nature. If what is natural were unchanging, then that dictum would have a simple meaning. It is by nature that we fear things that appear ready to do us harm, and contrary to nature to fear nothing or to be afraid of trivial events. The moral virtues involve fearing the right things for the right reasons in the right circumstances. Such fear is neither by nature nor contrary to nature. Of the three things in the soul in Nicomachean Ethics 11.5, passions and faculties (dynameis) are natural while hexeis, including the virtues and vices, are ethical.1 Because they are natural, the pas- sions and faculties are exempt from praise and blame? But what is natural changes over time, and what is natural to an individual depends in part on the accumulation of practical experience. It is plausible to suggest a parallel to Aristotle's dic- tum in Ethics IL1 and say that moral development is neither natu- ral nor

Journal

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy OnlineBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1994

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