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In my commentary on Mitchell Miller's paper, I am going to discuss three issues which he raises. All three issues are signifi- cant, although I disagree with the positions that Miller takes. The first issue is Miller's interpretation of å1tetpov in the description of the method at 16-18 of the Philebus. According to Miller, in the description of the method there are two types of many. One type of many is a fixed and definite many. Socrates' references to number throughout 16-18 are a reference to this fixed and definite many. Thus, for example, when Socrates speaks of bnoaa (of how many) at 16d7, this refers to the fixed and definite many. Miller's view is that the fixed and definite many refers to a set of transcendent forms; that is, to a set of forms which are separate from sensible things. According to Miller, there is another type of many discussed in the descrip- tion of the method (16-18). This is an unlimitedly many which is Miller's translation of the expression 1t0Â.Âà xai anetpa at 16d6. This unlimitedly many is a continuum, that is, a continuous range or series framed by two opposite forms. Miller and I dis-
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1990
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