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Nearly all contemporary philosophers reject the ancient hedonist view that an agent has a reason to commit an action just in case that action is pleasing to that agent. But few (if any) do so on the ground that an action's being pleasing to an agent gives that agent no reason whatsoever to commit that action. Instead they opt for a compromise position according to which the rational authority of one's own pleasures is unassailable, but not unlimited. My aim in this paper is to show that a frequently overlooked argument from Plato's Philebus poses a powerful challenge to this widely held compromise position. If my interpretation of this argument is correct, then Plato's case against hedonism is more radical, more subtle, and ultimately more appealing than anyone has yet realized. It often seems obvious to us that our pleasures can justify our actions. If I ask you why you're reading right now instead of dancing, and if your answer is that reading, unlike dancing, is just something you like to do, then (all else equal) your answer seems perfectly sufficient. To demand that you specify some further end you have in enjoying yourself would seem unreasonable if
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2008
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