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Colloquium 7: Wishing for Fortune, Choosing Activity: Aristotle on External Goods and Happiness 1

Colloquium 7: Wishing for Fortune, Choosing Activity: Aristotle on External Goods and Happiness 1 Aristotle's account of external goods in Nicomachean Ethics I 8-12 is often thought to amend his narrow claim that happiness is virtuous activity. I argue, to the contrary, that on Aristotle's account, external goods are necessary for happiness only because they are necessary for virtuous activity. My case innovates in three main respects: I offer a new map of EN I 8-12; I identify two mechanisms to explain why virtuous activity requires external goods, including a psychological need for external goods; and I show the relevance of Aristotle's distinction between wishing and choosing. On the view I attribute to Aristotle our capacity to choose virtuously requires, first, that we wish for external goods (because virtue requires the right attitudes of evaluation) and, second, that these wishes are generally fulfilled (because the social consequences and psychological pain of unfulfilled wishes undermine our opportunity to act virtuously and to take pleasure in acting virtuously). I close with discussion of how Aristotelians should defend this approach. I. Introduction In Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics (EN), 2 Aristotle seeks to identify the human good, which he also calls eudaimonia 3 or happiness (I 4, 1 For providing the initial stimulus to http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Online Brill

Colloquium 7: Wishing for Fortune, Choosing Activity: Aristotle on External Goods and Happiness 1

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
ISSN
1059-986X
eISSN
2213-4417
DOI
10.1163/22134417-90000085
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Aristotle's account of external goods in Nicomachean Ethics I 8-12 is often thought to amend his narrow claim that happiness is virtuous activity. I argue, to the contrary, that on Aristotle's account, external goods are necessary for happiness only because they are necessary for virtuous activity. My case innovates in three main respects: I offer a new map of EN I 8-12; I identify two mechanisms to explain why virtuous activity requires external goods, including a psychological need for external goods; and I show the relevance of Aristotle's distinction between wishing and choosing. On the view I attribute to Aristotle our capacity to choose virtuously requires, first, that we wish for external goods (because virtue requires the right attitudes of evaluation) and, second, that these wishes are generally fulfilled (because the social consequences and psychological pain of unfulfilled wishes undermine our opportunity to act virtuously and to take pleasure in acting virtuously). I close with discussion of how Aristotelians should defend this approach. I. Introduction In Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics (EN), 2 Aristotle seeks to identify the human good, which he also calls eudaimonia 3 or happiness (I 4, 1 For providing the initial stimulus to

Journal

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy OnlineBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2007

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