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Political Economy of Intellectual Property Policy-Making

Political Economy of Intellectual Property Policy-Making "0 cives, cives, 9uaerenda pecunia primum est; Virtuts post nummos!" " Horatius, Epistolae, I, 1, 53-54 I. INTRODUCTION Two separate and unrelated phenomena mark the end of a high-profile and extremely politicized debate in the intellectual property (IP) field. Two separate phenomena that emphasize the complexity of the political and economic context in which the process of IP policy-making is taking place. Two separate phenomena that highlight the interests, the forces, the lobby, and the power games characterizing this field. Two separate phenomena, the outcome of each amounting to nothing but a rather superficial, politically correct consensus with no substantial results one way or the other. But after such a bleak introduction, surely one needs to attach some titles to these phenomena. In fact, we will do more than that, as, for the sake of convenience, it would be useful to attach two titles to each phenomenon-the formal title and the actual title of what it is really all about. The first phenomenon may be formally referred to as the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions-Om in the popular jargon.1 Its actual caption, however, should be "the rise and http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of World Investment and Trade Brill

Political Economy of Intellectual Property Policy-Making

Journal of World Investment and Trade , Volume 7 (2): 18 – Jan 1, 2006
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References (1)

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1660-7112
eISSN
2211-9000
DOI
10.1163/221190006X00180
Publisher site
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Abstract

"0 cives, cives, 9uaerenda pecunia primum est; Virtuts post nummos!" " Horatius, Epistolae, I, 1, 53-54 I. INTRODUCTION Two separate and unrelated phenomena mark the end of a high-profile and extremely politicized debate in the intellectual property (IP) field. Two separate phenomena that emphasize the complexity of the political and economic context in which the process of IP policy-making is taking place. Two separate phenomena that highlight the interests, the forces, the lobby, and the power games characterizing this field. Two separate phenomena, the outcome of each amounting to nothing but a rather superficial, politically correct consensus with no substantial results one way or the other. But after such a bleak introduction, surely one needs to attach some titles to these phenomena. In fact, we will do more than that, as, for the sake of convenience, it would be useful to attach two titles to each phenomenon-the formal title and the actual title of what it is really all about. The first phenomenon may be formally referred to as the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions-Om in the popular jargon.1 Its actual caption, however, should be "the rise and

Journal

Journal of World Investment and Trade – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2006

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