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References (14)
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OUP 2009) 13-14. Similarly, it may be argued that as the TTIP is posited as a public court process, it is not 'capable of settlement by arbitration -
A. Broches (1995)
Selected Essays:World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law -
could be employed as a model in future FTA negotiations between the EU and China as well as other countries; see House of Lords, European Union Committee -
Razeen Sappideen, Ling He (2012)
Investor-State Arbitration: The Roadmap from the Multilateral Agreement on Investment to the Trans-Pacific Partnership AgreementFederal Law Review, 40
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It may also lead to a 'path dependence on prevailing treaty mechanisms such as ISDS. It is believed that this places a significant burden on less-developed countries -
Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: The Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties' (1998) 38 Va JIL 639 -
S. Schill (2016)
The European Commission’s Proposal of an 'Investment Court System' for TTIP: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law?, 20
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Scienze Politiche (2011)
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law -
That is despite the off-handed reference to an 'award' in TTIP, s 3, arts 28-30 -
Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law' (1995) 11 Arbitration International 1 -
Such shifts are perhaps not significant from the perspective of incremental trends over the last five years, since the 'new wave' of PTIAs commenced -
That is, in order for the award to be enforced under the New York Convention, it is required to be a 'commercial dispute' and awarded by a 'body', see art I -
Whereby 'each individual LDC is better off "defecting" from the group by signing a BIT that gives it an advantage over other LDCs in the competition to attract foreign investors -
As to the ramifications of establishing various ad hoc multilateral investment courts over an institutionalised investment court, and suggestions on the role of domestic courts, see Schill
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 1660-7112
- eISSN
- 2211-9000
- DOI
- 10.1163/22119000-12340012
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to critically analyse the methodology and impact of the investment chapter the European Union (EU) proposed for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It focusses on the innovations of an appellate body and the incorporation of a ‘right to regulate’-provision, as well as general exceptions that are very similar to Article XX of the GATT. In light of the development that these features have been replicated in the CETA and the EU-Vietnam FTA, it questions why the EU is changing the traditional form of investor-State arbitration in a preferential trade and investment agreement and whether the EU’s model is viable, and formulated on a robust design that will stand the test of time.
Journal
Journal of World Investment and Trade – Brill
Published: Sep 28, 2016
Keywords: appeal tribunal; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA); ICSID Convention; general exceptions; Investment Court System; investor-State dispute settlement; right to regulate; Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)