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Sextus Empiricus on Xenophanes’ Scepticism

Sextus Empiricus on Xenophanes’ Scepticism Sextus’ interpretation of Xenophanes’ scepticism in M 7.49–52 is often cited but has never been subject to detailed analysis. Such analysis reveals that Sextus’ interpretation raises far more complex problems than has been recognised. Scholars invariably assume one of two ways of construing his account of Xenophanes B34, without observing that the choice between these two alternatives poses an interpretive dilemma. Some scholars take it that Sextus ascribes to Xenophanes (i) the view that one may have knowledge without knowing that one has knowledge. Others take it that he ascribes to Xenophanes (ii) the view that one may have true belief without knowing that one has true belief. A close examination of Sextus’ paraphrase exposes a crucial but overlooked complication. Sextus elides Xenophanes’ pivotal distinction between knowing “the clear and certain” ( to saphes ) and believing “what has been fulfilled” ( tetelesmenon ). He eliminates altogether tetelesmenon from his analysis of B34, and expands the role of to saphes . I demonstrate that, as a result, Xenophanes B34, as interpreted by Sextus, does not consistently and straightforwardly express either view (i) or view (ii). Sextus, I argue, in fact develops a fundamentally incoherent interpretation of Xenophanes B34. On Sextus’ interpretation, Xenophanes justifies the proposition “No human knows” by arguing that, even if a human does , in fact, know, he does not know that he knows. Finally, I argue that Sextus’ incoherent account reflects not unthinking negligence, but a sophisticated if ultimately doomed attempt to interpret the logical structure of Xenophanes B34 in line with later models of second-order scepticism. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Brill

Sextus Empiricus on Xenophanes’ Scepticism

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2013 by Koninklijke Brill N.V., Leiden, The Netherlands
Subject
Articles
ISSN
2210-5697
eISSN
2210-5700
DOI
10.1163/221057012X630722
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Sextus’ interpretation of Xenophanes’ scepticism in M 7.49–52 is often cited but has never been subject to detailed analysis. Such analysis reveals that Sextus’ interpretation raises far more complex problems than has been recognised. Scholars invariably assume one of two ways of construing his account of Xenophanes B34, without observing that the choice between these two alternatives poses an interpretive dilemma. Some scholars take it that Sextus ascribes to Xenophanes (i) the view that one may have knowledge without knowing that one has knowledge. Others take it that he ascribes to Xenophanes (ii) the view that one may have true belief without knowing that one has true belief. A close examination of Sextus’ paraphrase exposes a crucial but overlooked complication. Sextus elides Xenophanes’ pivotal distinction between knowing “the clear and certain” ( to saphes ) and believing “what has been fulfilled” ( tetelesmenon ). He eliminates altogether tetelesmenon from his analysis of B34, and expands the role of to saphes . I demonstrate that, as a result, Xenophanes B34, as interpreted by Sextus, does not consistently and straightforwardly express either view (i) or view (ii). Sextus, I argue, in fact develops a fundamentally incoherent interpretation of Xenophanes B34. On Sextus’ interpretation, Xenophanes justifies the proposition “No human knows” by arguing that, even if a human does , in fact, know, he does not know that he knows. Finally, I argue that Sextus’ incoherent account reflects not unthinking negligence, but a sophisticated if ultimately doomed attempt to interpret the logical structure of Xenophanes B34 in line with later models of second-order scepticism.

Journal

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2013

Keywords: Sextus Empiricus; Xenophanes; B34; Metrodorus; second-order scepticism; doxography

References

  • “Le fragment DK 70 B 1 de Métrodore de Chio,”
  • Introduction: the Beginnings of Hellenistic Epistemology
  • Xenophanesstudien
  • Das Wissen Des Xenophanes
  • The Beginnings of Epistemology: from Homer to Philolaus
  • Xenophanes’ Scepticism
  • Xenophanes’ Epistemology and Parmenides’ Quest for Knowledge
  • Sextus Empiricus and the Atomist Criterion of Truth
  • Xenophanes: His Self-Consciousness as a Wise Man and Fr.34