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Doxastic Incontinence
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Subject
- Articles
- ISSN
- 2210-5697
- eISSN
- 2210-5700
- DOI
- 10.1163/22105700-00001226
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism presupposes voluntarism. I show that they rely on different versions of a depiction of scepticism as a conversion narrative. I argue that one version of this narrative does presuppose voluntarism, but the other does not. Moreover, alternative versions of the narrative are available. I conclude that scepticism does not presuppose voluntarism.
Journal
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism – Brill
Published: Mar 5, 2018
Keywords: scepticism; doxastic voluntarism; Sextus Empiricus; Descartes; Huet; Hume; La Forge