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THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST COGNITIVISM

THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST COGNITIVISM Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002) 217-233 THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST COGNITIVISM Josep E. CORBÍ University of València, Spain Summary Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper, I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical frame- work Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons’ case against Michael Smith’s metaethical rationalism. Al- though I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently elaborated a new collaborative paper entitled ‘Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Frame- work for a New Metaethics’, where they vindicate the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In some of their preceding collaborative papers, Horgan and Timmons had al- ready developed a number of arguments to challenge a few current at- tempts to buttress descriptivism and the corresponding metaphysical stance, namely: moral realism. They have mainly challenged Brink’s and Boyd’s attempt to treat moral terms as functional, that is, as terms that designate http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST COGNITIVISM

Corbí, Josep E.
Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 63 (1): 17 – Aug 12, 2002
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/18756735-90000765
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Abstract

Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002) 217-233 THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST COGNITIVISM Josep E. CORBÍ University of València, Spain Summary Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper, I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical frame- work Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons’ case against Michael Smith’s metaethical rationalism. Al- though I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently elaborated a new collaborative paper entitled ‘Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Frame- work for a New Metaethics’, where they vindicate the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In some of their preceding collaborative papers, Horgan and Timmons had al- ready developed a number of arguments to challenge a few current at- tempts to buttress descriptivism and the corresponding metaphysical stance, namely: moral realism. They have mainly challenged Brink’s and Boyd’s attempt to treat moral terms as functional, that is, as terms that designate

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Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill

Published: Aug 12, 2002

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