Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
D. Marcus (1997)
On knowing what one knows.The Psychoanalytic quarterly, 66 2
T. Reid (1970)
An inquiry into the human mind
A. Woozley, H. Prichard (1950)
Knowledge and perception
(1995)
Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham
B. Skyrms (1967)
The Explication of''X Knows That p
R. Feldman (1974)
An alleged defect in Gettier counter-examplesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, 52
Peter Klein (1971)
A Proposed Definition of Propositional KnowledgeThe Journal of Philosophy, 68
M. Engel (1992)
Personal and doxastic justification in epistemologyPhilosophical Studies, 67
Richard Feldman (1981)
Fallibilism and Knowing That One KnowsThe Philosophical Review, 90
P. Geach (1963)
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two NotionsPhilosophical Books, 4
(1967)
On Knowing that We Know", in Epistemology: New Essays in the TheoryofKnowledge, ed.AvrumStroll (Westport,Conn.
J. Yolton (1965)
Theory of Knowledge
M. Roth (1990)
The wall and the shield K-K reconsideredPhilosophical Studies, 59
(1974)
Knowledge (Oxford
Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (2000) 99-117 INTERNALISM, THE GETTIER PROBLEM, AND METAEPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM Mylan ENGEL, Jr. Northern Illinois University We roust recognize that whenever we know soroething we either do, or at least can, by re flecting, direct1y know that we are knowing it. H. A. Prichard Summary When it comes to second-order knowledge (i.e. knowing that one knows), internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by re flecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this intemalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for intemalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the the sis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one intemalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological sec ond-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, seriously undermine the possibility of anyone pos sessing second-order intemalistic knowledge. When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically echo Prichard 's sentiment that we can, simply by reflecting on it, de termine our epistemic status with respect to a given proposition. While they disagree about the ease with which one can know that one knows, they generally contend that there are
Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill
Published: Aug 12, 2000
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.