Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

INTERNALISM, THE GETTIER PROBLEM, AND METAEPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM

INTERNALISM, THE GETTIER PROBLEM, AND METAEPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (2000) 99-117 INTERNALISM, THE GETTIER PROBLEM, AND METAEPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM Mylan ENGEL, Jr. Northern Illinois University We roust recognize that whenever we know soroething we either do, or at least can, by re­ flecting, direct1y know that we are knowing it. H. A. Prichard Summary When it comes to second-order knowledge (i.e. knowing that one knows), internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by re­ flecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this intemalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for intemalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the the­ sis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one intemalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological sec­ ond-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, seriously undermine the possibility of anyone pos­ sessing second-order intemalistic knowledge. When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically echo Prichard 's sentiment that we can, simply by reflecting on it, de­ termine our epistemic status with respect to a given proposition. While they disagree about the ease with which one can know that one knows, they generally contend that there are http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

INTERNALISM, THE GETTIER PROBLEM, AND METAEPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM

Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 60 (1): 19 – Aug 12, 2000

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/internalism-the-gettier-problem-and-metaepistemological-skepticism-98p62WrsSC

References (14)

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/18756735-90000745
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (2000) 99-117 INTERNALISM, THE GETTIER PROBLEM, AND METAEPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM Mylan ENGEL, Jr. Northern Illinois University We roust recognize that whenever we know soroething we either do, or at least can, by re­ flecting, direct1y know that we are knowing it. H. A. Prichard Summary When it comes to second-order knowledge (i.e. knowing that one knows), internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by re­ flecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this intemalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for intemalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the the­ sis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one intemalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological sec­ ond-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, seriously undermine the possibility of anyone pos­ sessing second-order intemalistic knowledge. When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically echo Prichard 's sentiment that we can, simply by reflecting on it, de­ termine our epistemic status with respect to a given proposition. While they disagree about the ease with which one can know that one knows, they generally contend that there are

Journal

Grazer Philosophische StudienBrill

Published: Aug 12, 2000

There are no references for this article.