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Grazer Philosophische Studien 60(2000) 1-11 SET THEORY AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS FOUR SOLUT/ONS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON PROBLEM' Karel LAMBERT University of Califomia, Irvine, and University of Salzburg Summary This paper offers an explanation ofthe major traditions in the logical treat ment of definite descriptions as reactions to paradoxical naIve definite de scription theory. The explanation closely paralleis that of various set theories as reactions to paradoxical naIve set theory. Indeed, naIve set the ory is derivable from naIve definite description theory given an appropri ate definition of set abstracts in terms of definite descriptions. I begin with a slightly remodeled passage from an article by Bertrand Russell in 1905. It is not customary for philosophers to face the round square with very much courage; and indeed few logicians can withstand its onset. But if we are to be clear about [definitely described] objects, it is quite essen tial that we have a satisfactory way of dealing with "the round square". In this mildly corrupted quotation you have the primary source of • This is a Plenary Address to the joint meeting ofthe American Philosophi cal Association and the Association for Symbolic Logic in Washington D.C. in January, 2000.
Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill
Published: Aug 12, 2000
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