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SET THEORY AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS FOUR SOLUTIONS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON PROBLEM

SET THEORY AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS FOUR SOLUTIONS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON PROBLEM Grazer Philosophische Studien 60(2000) 1-11 SET THEORY AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS FOUR SOLUT/ONS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON PROBLEM' Karel LAMBERT University of Califomia, Irvine, and University of Salzburg Summary This paper offers an explanation ofthe major traditions in the logical treat­ ment of definite descriptions as reactions to paradoxical naIve definite de­ scription theory. The explanation closely paralleis that of various set theories as reactions to paradoxical naIve set theory. Indeed, naIve set the­ ory is derivable from naIve definite description theory given an appropri­ ate definition of set abstracts in terms of definite descriptions. I begin with a slightly remodeled passage from an article by Bertrand Russell in 1905. It is not customary for philosophers to face the round square with very much courage; and indeed few logicians can withstand its onset. But if we are to be clear about [definitely described] objects, it is quite essen­ tial that we have a satisfactory way of dealing with "the round square". In this mildly corrupted quotation you have the primary source of • This is a Plenary Address to the joint meeting ofthe American Philosophi­ cal Association and the Association for Symbolic Logic in Washington D.C. in January, 2000. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

SET THEORY AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS FOUR SOLUTIONS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON PROBLEM

Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 60 (1): 11 – Aug 12, 2000

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/18756735-90000740
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Grazer Philosophische Studien 60(2000) 1-11 SET THEORY AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS FOUR SOLUT/ONS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON PROBLEM' Karel LAMBERT University of Califomia, Irvine, and University of Salzburg Summary This paper offers an explanation ofthe major traditions in the logical treat­ ment of definite descriptions as reactions to paradoxical naIve definite de­ scription theory. The explanation closely paralleis that of various set theories as reactions to paradoxical naIve set theory. Indeed, naIve set the­ ory is derivable from naIve definite description theory given an appropri­ ate definition of set abstracts in terms of definite descriptions. I begin with a slightly remodeled passage from an article by Bertrand Russell in 1905. It is not customary for philosophers to face the round square with very much courage; and indeed few logicians can withstand its onset. But if we are to be clear about [definitely described] objects, it is quite essen­ tial that we have a satisfactory way of dealing with "the round square". In this mildly corrupted quotation you have the primary source of • This is a Plenary Address to the joint meeting ofthe American Philosophi­ cal Association and the Association for Symbolic Logic in Washington D.C. in January, 2000.

Journal

Grazer Philosophische StudienBrill

Published: Aug 12, 2000

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