Abstract

WITIGENSTEIN ON MEANING EddyZEMACH Tbe Hebrew University of Jerosalem In this artic1e I argue that Wittgenstein's mature theory of meaning is mentalistic and internalistic: reference is determined by mental representations which playa semantic role in virtue of their aesthetic properties. That thesis, I know, sounds odd; the accepted view is that Wittgenstein held that mental representation is irrelevant to meaning. He is taken to have shown that mental objects are semantically inert: a cat-image, for example, cannot constrain the application of the term 'cat' at all, for it can be interpreted as sanctioning any application whatever of that term. A cat-image may be taken to enjoin that 'cat' denotes noncats, or snakes, or prime numbers, or anything else. Most interpreters believe that Wittgenstein has drawn the conclusion, that nothing, mental or otherwise, can proscribe an extension. Tberefore, mental items are semantically useless. They cannot predetermine the application of any expression: an expression has an actual use in a public language game, and that is the only meaning it has. A related argument (anticipated by Lewis Carroll 1 and Kant2) i.s that any mental role that is supposed to direct the application of 'cat' requires another role on how