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MEINONG ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEONTIC LOGIC

MEINONG ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEONTIC LOGIC Seppo SAlAMA University of Turku I. THE PROBLEM AND TWO TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts. By deontic concepts I mean the concepts used by standard deontic logic: obligatory ,permitted andforbidden. And by axiological concepts I mean the concepts good, indifferent (neutral) and bad. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms and the other maintains that there is a relation of dependence between them. Kant, the leading spokesman of the former position, argues that there is no connection whatever between duty and value. At any rate, the oughtness of an action is certainly not determined by the value brought about by the action. Mill, a representative of the competing position, argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. More exactly, he maintains that oughtness is directly proportional to goodness: the better the con­ sequences of an action, the stronger the oughtness attached to the action. Neither Kant nor Mill seems to do justice to our moral intuitions. Kant fails because he denies the existence of any kind of connection between goodness and oughtness. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

MEINONG ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEONTIC LOGIC

Sajama, Seppo
Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 32 (1): 13 – Aug 13, 1988
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/18756735-90000368
Publisher site
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Abstract

Seppo SAlAMA University of Turku I. THE PROBLEM AND TWO TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts. By deontic concepts I mean the concepts used by standard deontic logic: obligatory ,permitted andforbidden. And by axiological concepts I mean the concepts good, indifferent (neutral) and bad. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms and the other maintains that there is a relation of dependence between them. Kant, the leading spokesman of the former position, argues that there is no connection whatever between duty and value. At any rate, the oughtness of an action is certainly not determined by the value brought about by the action. Mill, a representative of the competing position, argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. More exactly, he maintains that oughtness is directly proportional to goodness: the better the con­ sequences of an action, the stronger the oughtness attached to the action. Neither Kant nor Mill seems to do justice to our moral intuitions. Kant fails because he denies the existence of any kind of connection between goodness and oughtness.

Journal

Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill

Published: Aug 13, 1988

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