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RYLE’S PARADOX AND THE CONCEPT OF EXEMPLIFICATION

RYLE’S PARADOX AND THE CONCEPT OF EXEMPLIFICATION RYLE'S PARADOX AND THE CONCEPT OF EXEMPLIFICATION* Amold CUSMARIU - University of Rhode Island Some years ago, in the first of two studies on Plato's Parmenides, 1 Gilbert Ryle gave an argument to show that Plato's Theory of Forms was a 'logically viciouS'2 doctrine. Two recent commentators on Ryle's argument, Alan Donagan ahd David Armstrong4, agree that the argument has this consequence. But I think that Ryle's argument does not succeed in showing Platonic Realism to be 'logically vicious' although it does bring up an important, and deep, question which Platonic Realists should be able to answer satisfactorily. So I will do two things in this paper. First, I will reply to Ryle's argument and then I will reply to the question wh ich that argument raises. 1. Ryle's Argument Ryle hopes to show that Platonic Realism is 'logically vicious' by showing that its account of predication (see (A) and (D) below) leads to absurdity. He states his argument rather loosely, in a passage in which he seems to be playing a kind of question-and-answer game. To make it easier to extrude an argument out of this passage, I will number the sentences which make it up, keeping their http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

RYLE’S PARADOX AND THE CONCEPT OF EXEMPLIFICATION

Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 10 (1): 8 – Aug 13, 1980

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/18756735-90000078
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

RYLE'S PARADOX AND THE CONCEPT OF EXEMPLIFICATION* Amold CUSMARIU - University of Rhode Island Some years ago, in the first of two studies on Plato's Parmenides, 1 Gilbert Ryle gave an argument to show that Plato's Theory of Forms was a 'logically viciouS'2 doctrine. Two recent commentators on Ryle's argument, Alan Donagan ahd David Armstrong4, agree that the argument has this consequence. But I think that Ryle's argument does not succeed in showing Platonic Realism to be 'logically vicious' although it does bring up an important, and deep, question which Platonic Realists should be able to answer satisfactorily. So I will do two things in this paper. First, I will reply to Ryle's argument and then I will reply to the question wh ich that argument raises. 1. Ryle's Argument Ryle hopes to show that Platonic Realism is 'logically vicious' by showing that its account of predication (see (A) and (D) below) leads to absurdity. He states his argument rather loosely, in a passage in which he seems to be playing a kind of question-and-answer game. To make it easier to extrude an argument out of this passage, I will number the sentences which make it up, keeping their

Journal

Grazer Philosophische StudienBrill

Published: Aug 13, 1980

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