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KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF; FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF; FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF; FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS Joseph MARGOLIS - Temple University "The world", Wittgenstein says, "is all that is the case. The world is the totality of facts, not ofthings".1 Rad Wittgenstein chosen things (events, processes, physical objects ... ) rather than facts to constitute the world, he could not have maintained his picture theory of languagc: there could then have been no structure that the facts constituting the world and our logical pictures of the world might share. Surprisingly, the issue bears on the distinction between knowledge and belief. "The immediate object of knowledge", Zeno Vendlcr holds, "is not a 'knowledge', a ('true') picture ofreality, but reality itself" - where, by reality, Vendler means, facts. 2 "A statement or belief is true", he says, "if it agrees with what is the case, if it fits the facts" (p. 83). Vendler's use of the Wittgensteinian idiom is caught up ingeniously in the thesis that "the same grammatical construction, the familiar noun-c1ause, is commonly used either to express a proposition or to denote a fact" (p. 89). That is, propositions or propositions believed count as (intended) pictures of facts; and the facts, wh ich are said to provide "the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF; FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS

Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 2 (1): 41 – Aug 13, 1976

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF; FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS

Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 2 (1): 41 – Aug 13, 1976

Abstract

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF; FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS Joseph MARGOLIS - Temple University "The world", Wittgenstein says, "is all that is the case. The world is the totality of facts, not ofthings".1 Rad Wittgenstein chosen things (events, processes, physical objects ... ) rather than facts to constitute the world, he could not have maintained his picture theory of languagc: there could then have been no structure that the facts constituting the world and our logical pictures of the world might share. Surprisingly, the issue bears on the distinction between knowledge and belief. "The immediate object of knowledge", Zeno Vendlcr holds, "is not a 'knowledge', a ('true') picture ofreality, but reality itself" - where, by reality, Vendler means, facts. 2 "A statement or belief is true", he says, "if it agrees with what is the case, if it fits the facts" (p. 83). Vendler's use of the Wittgensteinian idiom is caught up ingeniously in the thesis that "the same grammatical construction, the familiar noun-c1ause, is commonly used either to express a proposition or to denote a fact" (p. 89). That is, propositions or propositions believed count as (intended) pictures of facts; and the facts, wh ich are said to provide "the

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Copyright 1976 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/18756735-90000021
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF; FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS Joseph MARGOLIS - Temple University "The world", Wittgenstein says, "is all that is the case. The world is the totality of facts, not ofthings".1 Rad Wittgenstein chosen things (events, processes, physical objects ... ) rather than facts to constitute the world, he could not have maintained his picture theory of languagc: there could then have been no structure that the facts constituting the world and our logical pictures of the world might share. Surprisingly, the issue bears on the distinction between knowledge and belief. "The immediate object of knowledge", Zeno Vendlcr holds, "is not a 'knowledge', a ('true') picture ofreality, but reality itself" - where, by reality, Vendler means, facts. 2 "A statement or belief is true", he says, "if it agrees with what is the case, if it fits the facts" (p. 83). Vendler's use of the Wittgensteinian idiom is caught up ingeniously in the thesis that "the same grammatical construction, the familiar noun-c1ause, is commonly used either to express a proposition or to denote a fact" (p. 89). That is, propositions or propositions believed count as (intended) pictures of facts; and the facts, wh ich are said to provide "the

Journal

Grazer Philosophische StudienBrill

Published: Aug 13, 1976

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