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83 Power (conatus-endeavour) in the "kinetic actualism" and in the "inertial" psychology of Thomas Hobbes1 AGOSTINO LUPOLI This paper intends to trace some aspects of Hobbes's concept of power (and of conatus - «endevour» - its elementary component) in two different contexts of his philosophy; first, as it is a basic concept of his mechanicism, second, as a key concept of his psychology. From the first standpoint, the concepts of power and conatus are intrinsical- ly and necessarily tied to the peculiar concept of matter the English philosopher first attained, in all probability, through a mental process guided by the rejection of Aristotle's physics. Given the obvious difference with Gassendi's atomism that arises from Hobbes's denial of the vacuum', perhaps the easiest way to outline the Hobbesian concept is to match it against the other best known and important version of plenistic mechanicism, that is the Cartesian version. The Hobbesian doctrine, in spite of the fact that it shares with the Cartesian doctrine the plenis- tic model, also presents crucial differences and peculiarities, which very clearly emerged as early as the epistolary exchange Hobbes was very concerned in keeping with Descartes in 1640-41 - Mersenne acting as an
Hobbes Studies – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2001
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