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The New Cold War. How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West

The New Cold War. How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West BOOK REVIEW The New Cold War. How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West, Edward Lucas, Bloomsbury; London/New York/Berlin, 2008, 2007, 342 pp . ISBN -9780747595786 Rob Zaagman 1 With Georgia on our minds, this book makes for very topical reading indeed. Edward Lucas, the Central and East European correspondent of The Economist, delivers a stark wake-up call: the New Cold War ( NCW ) is being won by Russia and the West is not even aware that it has started. Even though Lucas finds the NCW less scary and dangerous than the old one, he thinks time is pressing and tough measures are needed because ‘We are facing people who want to harm us, frustrate us and weaken us.’[270] The leaders in the Kremlin are anti-Western; indeed, he sees anti-Westernism as one major element of a new emerging state ideology, an unholy trinity of which the other components are historical revisionism (regarding Stalinism, the incorporation into the Soviet Union of the Baltic states et cetera) and religion (the Russian Orthodox Church assisting the Kremlin in differentiating between Western and Russian values and underscoring Russian exceptionalism). The first 100 pages deal with domestic developments. Lucas describes how Putin came to power and how by 2004 the checks, balances and other possible centres of influence (parliament, business, the media and civil society, regional governments) had been brought to heel. Lucas points out that these developments did not meet with a great deal of international resistance. At any rate, he argues, the possibilities for the West to exert economic pressure were only minimal, given Russia’s new-found wealth (oil, gas). Economics is central to Lucas’ argument: money from its energy resources is Russia’s powerbase for waging the NCW against the West. An important chapter is entitled ‘Pipeline policies’, that is: gas pipelines. According to Lucas, the Kremlin sees and uses Russia’s wealth of energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, Russia is projecting its ‘energy power’ outwards, agreeing politically loaded and politically effective pipeline deals (e.g. Nordstream) with countries like Germany. He contrasts this development with a divided and vulnerable Europe which is unable to push its own pipeline project forward (Nabucco). For now, Russia depends on its sales to Western Europe as much as a 1 Rob Zaagman is an official of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former editor of Security and Human Rights . Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 329 Book review number of EU states depend on Russian gas deliveries. However, Lucas thinks that the European ‘hold’ on Russia will diminish considerably because other customers will come knocking on Gazprom’s doors and because the Russian domestic market will gobble up more of its gas. This, he argues, will lead to a change in the European balance of power, even to the ‘energy Finlandisation’ of Europe. [262] The military part of the equation is much less important to his argument about the NCW , Russia being militarily weak compared to NATO . Nevertheless, he thinks that Russia’s remaining military might could tip the balance in other conflicts (‘hot or cold’) by projecting a — mainly symbolic — presence or by selling weapons, and it allows the Kremlin to posture. The Russian-Georgian conflict would not have surprised Lucas although it might have led him to sharpen his views of the uses of Russian military power somewhat. In his view, the Eastern European and FSU states are in the frontline of the NCW . While the expansion eastward of Euro-Atlantic structures and partnerships is stalling, Russian hard and soft power is growing and pressure is mounting on countries like Georgia and the Baltic states. What should the West do? Lucas thinks that, although there is precious little time left, it is not too late to act if the West is willing to pay a price. ‘The price of a confrontation now may be economic pain and political uncertainty. But it still offers the chance of a new relationship with Russia based on realism rather than sentiment, and tough mindedness rather than wishful thinking. The price later will be higher - perhaps so high that the West will no longer be able to pay it.‘ [268] The first step should be that the West realises and accepts what is happening, i.e. that the Kremlin wants to harm us; that we are back in an era of great-power politics; and that we cannot influence Russia’s domestic policies. Second, the West should counter Russia’s objective of driving a wedge between the US and the EU : the US should refrain from ‘divisive deals’ with the Kremlin and the EU should end its ‘disdain’ for the US . More in general, the West should rediscover the ‘virtues of collective action and solidarity in traditional diplomacy and politics’, in particular with the small countries in the frontline (e.g. Georgia, which should be offered MAP status as soon as possible — this was written before the recent crisis — and as much EU help as possible.) Third, the West should rewrite the rules for business, finance and the energy market. Lucas does not recommend an outright blocking of trade with or investments in Russia, but the West should demand the same access to Russia that Russia has to the economies of the West. The EU should focus sharply on gas, which Lucas sees as its greatest vulnerability. Finally, as in the Old Cold War a war of values needs to be fought. Soft power, Lucas writes, is still our greatest asset and it is still possible to prevent the spread of anti-Westernism from the current leaders to the general Russian public. This last point leads me to the one major issue I have with this book, which otherwise I find thought-provoking and very accessible for the general reader. Overall, Lucas pays too little attention to Russian self-perceptions and the psychology of Russian resentment — by the public and the elite — after years of Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 330 Book review — perceived or real - humiliations at the hands of Yeltsin cum suis and the West. 2 He himself notes that the large majority of Russians are very satisfied with Putin, who after the disastrous Yeltsin years gave them back national self-respect. Already under Yeltsin Russian disenchantment with the West grew and criticism became increasingly sharp, also among pro-Western members of the elite. Given these circumstances, how does Lucas square the tough confrontation that he recommends with preventing anti-Westernism from spreading among the Russian public? One could argue that this does not matter, or at least not in the short run, because a great challenge must be urgently met. But after containment — or a parallel to it — should come engagement, and that requires more of an understanding of what makes the Russians tick than that with which Lucas provides us. 2 For that, one can turn to Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (Blackwell Publishing/Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 2003), Chatham House Papers. See also the ‘conversation’ between Erik Holm and Godert de Vos van Steenwijk in the previous issue of this journal. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Security and Human Rights Brill

The New Cold War. How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West

Zaagman, Rob
Security and Human Rights , Volume 19 (4): 328 – Jan 1, 2008
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2008 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1874-7337
eISSN
1875-0230
DOI
10.1163/187502308786691063
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Abstract

BOOK REVIEW The New Cold War. How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West, Edward Lucas, Bloomsbury; London/New York/Berlin, 2008, 2007, 342 pp . ISBN -9780747595786 Rob Zaagman 1 With Georgia on our minds, this book makes for very topical reading indeed. Edward Lucas, the Central and East European correspondent of The Economist, delivers a stark wake-up call: the New Cold War ( NCW ) is being won by Russia and the West is not even aware that it has started. Even though Lucas finds the NCW less scary and dangerous than the old one, he thinks time is pressing and tough measures are needed because ‘We are facing people who want to harm us, frustrate us and weaken us.’[270] The leaders in the Kremlin are anti-Western; indeed, he sees anti-Westernism as one major element of a new emerging state ideology, an unholy trinity of which the other components are historical revisionism (regarding Stalinism, the incorporation into the Soviet Union of the Baltic states et cetera) and religion (the Russian Orthodox Church assisting the Kremlin in differentiating between Western and Russian values and underscoring Russian exceptionalism). The first 100 pages deal with domestic developments. Lucas describes how Putin came to power and how by 2004 the checks, balances and other possible centres of influence (parliament, business, the media and civil society, regional governments) had been brought to heel. Lucas points out that these developments did not meet with a great deal of international resistance. At any rate, he argues, the possibilities for the West to exert economic pressure were only minimal, given Russia’s new-found wealth (oil, gas). Economics is central to Lucas’ argument: money from its energy resources is Russia’s powerbase for waging the NCW against the West. An important chapter is entitled ‘Pipeline policies’, that is: gas pipelines. According to Lucas, the Kremlin sees and uses Russia’s wealth of energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, Russia is projecting its ‘energy power’ outwards, agreeing politically loaded and politically effective pipeline deals (e.g. Nordstream) with countries like Germany. He contrasts this development with a divided and vulnerable Europe which is unable to push its own pipeline project forward (Nabucco). For now, Russia depends on its sales to Western Europe as much as a 1 Rob Zaagman is an official of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former editor of Security and Human Rights . Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 329 Book review number of EU states depend on Russian gas deliveries. However, Lucas thinks that the European ‘hold’ on Russia will diminish considerably because other customers will come knocking on Gazprom’s doors and because the Russian domestic market will gobble up more of its gas. This, he argues, will lead to a change in the European balance of power, even to the ‘energy Finlandisation’ of Europe. [262] The military part of the equation is much less important to his argument about the NCW , Russia being militarily weak compared to NATO . Nevertheless, he thinks that Russia’s remaining military might could tip the balance in other conflicts (‘hot or cold’) by projecting a — mainly symbolic — presence or by selling weapons, and it allows the Kremlin to posture. The Russian-Georgian conflict would not have surprised Lucas although it might have led him to sharpen his views of the uses of Russian military power somewhat. In his view, the Eastern European and FSU states are in the frontline of the NCW . While the expansion eastward of Euro-Atlantic structures and partnerships is stalling, Russian hard and soft power is growing and pressure is mounting on countries like Georgia and the Baltic states. What should the West do? Lucas thinks that, although there is precious little time left, it is not too late to act if the West is willing to pay a price. ‘The price of a confrontation now may be economic pain and political uncertainty. But it still offers the chance of a new relationship with Russia based on realism rather than sentiment, and tough mindedness rather than wishful thinking. The price later will be higher - perhaps so high that the West will no longer be able to pay it.‘ [268] The first step should be that the West realises and accepts what is happening, i.e. that the Kremlin wants to harm us; that we are back in an era of great-power politics; and that we cannot influence Russia’s domestic policies. Second, the West should counter Russia’s objective of driving a wedge between the US and the EU : the US should refrain from ‘divisive deals’ with the Kremlin and the EU should end its ‘disdain’ for the US . More in general, the West should rediscover the ‘virtues of collective action and solidarity in traditional diplomacy and politics’, in particular with the small countries in the frontline (e.g. Georgia, which should be offered MAP status as soon as possible — this was written before the recent crisis — and as much EU help as possible.) Third, the West should rewrite the rules for business, finance and the energy market. Lucas does not recommend an outright blocking of trade with or investments in Russia, but the West should demand the same access to Russia that Russia has to the economies of the West. The EU should focus sharply on gas, which Lucas sees as its greatest vulnerability. Finally, as in the Old Cold War a war of values needs to be fought. Soft power, Lucas writes, is still our greatest asset and it is still possible to prevent the spread of anti-Westernism from the current leaders to the general Russian public. This last point leads me to the one major issue I have with this book, which otherwise I find thought-provoking and very accessible for the general reader. Overall, Lucas pays too little attention to Russian self-perceptions and the psychology of Russian resentment — by the public and the elite — after years of Security and Human Rights 2008 no. 4 330 Book review — perceived or real - humiliations at the hands of Yeltsin cum suis and the West. 2 He himself notes that the large majority of Russians are very satisfied with Putin, who after the disastrous Yeltsin years gave them back national self-respect. Already under Yeltsin Russian disenchantment with the West grew and criticism became increasingly sharp, also among pro-Western members of the elite. Given these circumstances, how does Lucas square the tough confrontation that he recommends with preventing anti-Westernism from spreading among the Russian public? One could argue that this does not matter, or at least not in the short run, because a great challenge must be urgently met. But after containment — or a parallel to it — should come engagement, and that requires more of an understanding of what makes the Russians tick than that with which Lucas provides us. 2 For that, one can turn to Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (Blackwell Publishing/Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 2003), Chatham House Papers. See also the ‘conversation’ between Erik Holm and Godert de Vos van Steenwijk in the previous issue of this journal.

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Security and Human Rights – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2008

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