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/lp/brill/federalism-and-compliance-with-international-agreements-belgium-and-4ypUAlPauG
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- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © 2010 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 1871-1901
- eISSN
- 1871-191X
- DOI
- 10.1163/1871191x-05010108
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This article aims to assess the effectiveness of two systems of governance with respect to the making of international treaties: the Canadian system, where the decision-making process is more centralized and where intergovernmental mechanisms are poorly institutionalized; and the Belgian system, where sub-state actors have the role of co-decision and where intergovernmental mechanisms are highly institutionalized. The central question to be discussed is: is the fact that one gives an important role to sub-state actors in the making of a country’s treaty by means of institutionalized intergovernmental mechanisms something that negatively or positively affects the foreign policy of a state? And is this a positive- or a negative-sum game at the level of the conclusion and implementation of treaties? The article concludes that the Belgian system is more effective, largely because its sub-state actors have an important role at every step of the conclusion of a treaty.
Journal
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2010
Keywords: paradiplomacy; federalism; international agreements; Canada; Belgium; treaty-making