Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/brill/analysing-the-power-of-the-european-union-s-diplomatic-service-do-the-pVZIrABdiA
References (9)
-
Michael. Smith (2013)
The European External Action Service and the security–development nexus: organizing for effectiveness or incoherence?Journal of European Public Policy, 20
-
K. Raube (2012)
The European External Action Service and the European ParliamentThe Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7
-
F. Scharpf (1988)
THE JOINT‐DECISION TRAP: LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONPublic Administration, 66
-
Mark Pollack (2003)
The Engines of European Integration -
O. Williamson (1985)
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting -
J. Tallberg (2002)
Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?West European Politics, 25
-
Michelle. Egan (1998)
Regulatory strategies, delegation and European market integrationJournal of European Public Policy, 5
-
Hussein Kassim, Anand Menon (2003)
The principal-agent approach and the study of the European Union: promise unfulfilled?Journal of European Public Policy, 10
-
Hrant. Kostanyan (2013)
Don't fix what ain't broke: a German-led proposal to change how the neighbourhood policy is managed is misguided
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 1871-1901
- eISSN
- 1871-191X
- DOI
- 10.1163/1871191X-12341326
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
By applying the rational choice principal–agent model, this article examines the European Union member states’ principal control of the European External Action Service ( eeas ) agent . More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal–agent model to analyse the establishment and functioning of the eeas . These mechanisms aim to ensure the eeas ’s compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal that the eeas is tightly controlled by the eu member states. Moreover the European Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the eeas . The application of the principal–agent model to control the eeas is not without its limits. The model falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to this model.
Journal
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy – Brill
Published: Nov 27, 2016
Keywords: European Union ( eu ); eu foreign policy; European External Action Service ( eeas ); Lisbon Treaty; principal–agent