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References (20)
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- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © 2017 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Subject
- Review Article
- ISSN
- 1740-4681
- eISSN
- 1745-5243
- DOI
- 10.1163/17455243-01401001
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Väyrynen’s The Rude, the Lewd and the Nasty . Väyrynen’s book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Väyrynen’s arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to be (semantically) evaluative, and whether Väyrynen’s arguments generalize to thin evaluative concepts.
Journal
Journal of Moral Philosophy – Brill
Published: Dec 28, 2017
Keywords: thick concepts; thick terms; thin concepts; Pekka Väyrynen; evaluative language; normativity