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This volume brings together essays that touch in some way on the relationship between intention and practical rationality. Some do so by exploring other issues along the way, including the nature of friendship, the structure and metaphysics of agency, intentions, and decision and game theory. The contributions are all original and do not represent a slavish devotion to any particular orthodoxy. If anything, these essays represent a turn away from the orthodoxy in rational choice theory that ignores intentions altogether and a turn towards ways of thinking about practical rationality that take seriously the role of intentions in our practical deliberation. Focusing chiefly on future-directed intentions, the essays in the volume take either the view that intentions provide new reasons for action beyond those provided by beliefs, desires, and other considerations in practical deliberation or they reject the idea that intentions provide any reasons for action. But they all agree that an agent’s having a future-directed intention implies some sort of practical commitment on the part of the agent. In his introduction to the volume, Bruno Verbeek nicely divides up the conceptual space regarding how to understand the nature of practical commitment (pp. 4-11). On the one hand,
Journal of Moral Philosophy – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2012
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