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In this clear and concise monograph, Beitz argues in favor of a ‘practical’ theory of human rights. Inspired by Rawls’s approach to human rights in The Law of Peoples , the book follows nearly a decade of publications proposing what Beitz has called both a ‘practical’ and a ‘functional’ approach to human rights, which ties the content of human rights doctrine to its functions and roles in international relations. But where those early papers could only hint at how a practical approach to human rights might work, this longer examination of the subject draws out real contrasts with the dominant understandings of human rights. The central and groundbreaking argument of the book suggests that (1) the modern practice of human rights is not adequately explained by traditional human rights theory; and (2) that the modern practice of human rights nonetheless exhibits a form of normativity that arises from the distinctive functions of international human rights. The familiar accounts of human rights by Griffin, Donnelly, and others place human rights in a continuous history with natural rights and natural law. Human rights have changed over the centuries, of course, but the iterations of various doctrines of the Rights of
Journal of Moral Philosophy – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2011
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