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The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability

The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability 414 Book Reviews / Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010) 411–419 Stephen Darwall, Th e Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 348 pp. ISBN 0674022742 (hbk). Hardback/Paperback: £32.95/–. In Th e Second-Person Standpoint , Stephen Darwall develops a broadly Kantian conception of morality and practical reasoning based in the special character of ‘second-personal address’. For Darwall, to address someone in the second person is to make a claim or demand on her, where such claims are meant to constitute ‘second-personal reasons’ to act in some way. A reason is second-personal if it comes into being only through the exercise of a normative power that the claimant has with respect to the person addressed. To prop- erly respond to a second-personal reason, the addressee must recognize this authority and be able to act immediately from this recognition, in independence of her concern for any desirable outcome. Not every way in which we might give others practical reasons is second-personal in this sense. When we give advice or make suggestions, we off er considerations in favor of some course of action that hold independently of our pointing them out. I may call upon some- http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Moral Philosophy Brill

The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability

Journal of Moral Philosophy , Volume 7 (3): 414 – Jan 1, 2010

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2010 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1740-4681
eISSN
1745-5243
DOI
10.1163/174552410X511482
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

414 Book Reviews / Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010) 411–419 Stephen Darwall, Th e Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 348 pp. ISBN 0674022742 (hbk). Hardback/Paperback: £32.95/–. In Th e Second-Person Standpoint , Stephen Darwall develops a broadly Kantian conception of morality and practical reasoning based in the special character of ‘second-personal address’. For Darwall, to address someone in the second person is to make a claim or demand on her, where such claims are meant to constitute ‘second-personal reasons’ to act in some way. A reason is second-personal if it comes into being only through the exercise of a normative power that the claimant has with respect to the person addressed. To prop- erly respond to a second-personal reason, the addressee must recognize this authority and be able to act immediately from this recognition, in independence of her concern for any desirable outcome. Not every way in which we might give others practical reasons is second-personal in this sense. When we give advice or make suggestions, we off er considerations in favor of some course of action that hold independently of our pointing them out. I may call upon some-

Journal

Journal of Moral PhilosophyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2010

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