Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
414 Book Reviews / Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010) 411–419 Stephen Darwall, Th e Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 348 pp. ISBN 0674022742 (hbk). Hardback/Paperback: £32.95/–. In Th e Second-Person Standpoint , Stephen Darwall develops a broadly Kantian conception of morality and practical reasoning based in the special character of ‘second-personal address’. For Darwall, to address someone in the second person is to make a claim or demand on her, where such claims are meant to constitute ‘second-personal reasons’ to act in some way. A reason is second-personal if it comes into being only through the exercise of a normative power that the claimant has with respect to the person addressed. To prop- erly respond to a second-personal reason, the addressee must recognize this authority and be able to act immediately from this recognition, in independence of her concern for any desirable outcome. Not every way in which we might give others practical reasons is second-personal in this sense. When we give advice or make suggestions, we off er considerations in favor of some course of action that hold independently of our pointing them out. I may call upon some-
Journal of Moral Philosophy – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2010
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.