Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/brill/punishing-states-and-the-spectre-of-guilt-by-association-8X9vnu2Teq
References
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © 2014 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Subject
- Articles
- ISSN
- 1567-536X
- eISSN
- 1571-8123
- DOI
- 10.1163/15718123-01405009
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Proponents of punishing states often claim that such punishment would not distribute to members of the state, and so it would not subject innocent citizens – those who did not participate in the crimes, or dissented, or even were among the victims – to guilt by association. This essay examines three features of state punishment that might be said not to distribute to citizens: it is burdensome, it is intentionally so, and it expresses social condemnation. Ultimately, I contend that when a state is punished, the burdens do distribute to citizens as intended, condemning burdens – that is, as punishment. Thus the nondistribution of punishment thesis fails as a response to the guilt-by-association objection.
Journal
International Criminal Law Review – Brill
Published: Jul 31, 2014
Keywords: international criminal law; punishment; mass crimes; responsibility