Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
127 Hermeneutics without Relativism: Husserl's Theory of Mind RICHARD COBB-STEVENS Boston College Contemporary dissatisfaction with the theme of representation testifies to a significant change in the metaphors guiding philosophical inquiry. The central metaphor is no longer seeing, but doing. William James' decision to consider truth as pragmatic adaption rather than as accurate representation no longer seems as shocking to us as it was to Bradley. We have gradually become accustomed to the idea that knowing is a strategy for negotiating with reality, rather than a contemplative insight into essences. Although we maintain a verbal allegiance to ideals like objective criteria and rationally discernible ethical standards, we really think of knowing as subjective interpretation and of ethics as the enlightened management of conflicting personal preference. The rejection of the metaphor of knowing as seeing is not complete, however, since it is commonplace to find criticism of essential insight combined with emphasis on the perspectival character of all knowing. Moreover, whereas the theme of perspective traditionally described the situated status of our intuitive access to what is, now we tend more and more to understand perspectivity in a relativistic manner. Truth claims are merely points of view, in the sense
Research in Phenomenology – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1982
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.