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Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of the Unconscious

Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of the Unconscious 77 Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of the Unconscious* TONY O'CONNOR University College, Cork, Ireland I In the course of a rambling discussion of the character of identity and difference in the Sophist, the Stranger reaches a stage where he is able to assert that each thing is both the same as itself, and different from that which is not itself'. A problem immediately arises, however, when the attempt is made to predicate existence of these identities, for, although existence may be combined with things, it somehow re- mains distinct, other, outside the referential system: "And moreover we shall say that this nature pervades all the forms, for each one is dif- ferent from the rest, not by virtue of its own nature, but because it partakes in the character of difference"2. This naming of existence by Plato in Derridean terms as a diverted presentation irreducibly witheld is not unique to the Sophist. A similar model is operative in the Republic where Plato asserts that the Good, the foundation of things, is both the object of rational knowledge, and outside the system of Being and knowledge altogether'. This does not make it a thing-in-itself, or an absent neutrality. On http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of the Unconscious

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 10 (1): 77 – Jan 1, 1980

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1980 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916480X00073
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

77 Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of the Unconscious* TONY O'CONNOR University College, Cork, Ireland I In the course of a rambling discussion of the character of identity and difference in the Sophist, the Stranger reaches a stage where he is able to assert that each thing is both the same as itself, and different from that which is not itself'. A problem immediately arises, however, when the attempt is made to predicate existence of these identities, for, although existence may be combined with things, it somehow re- mains distinct, other, outside the referential system: "And moreover we shall say that this nature pervades all the forms, for each one is dif- ferent from the rest, not by virtue of its own nature, but because it partakes in the character of difference"2. This naming of existence by Plato in Derridean terms as a diverted presentation irreducibly witheld is not unique to the Sophist. A similar model is operative in the Republic where Plato asserts that the Good, the foundation of things, is both the object of rational knowledge, and outside the system of Being and knowledge altogether'. This does not make it a thing-in-itself, or an absent neutrality. On

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1980

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