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77 Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of the Unconscious* TONY O'CONNOR University College, Cork, Ireland I In the course of a rambling discussion of the character of identity and difference in the Sophist, the Stranger reaches a stage where he is able to assert that each thing is both the same as itself, and different from that which is not itself'. A problem immediately arises, however, when the attempt is made to predicate existence of these identities, for, although existence may be combined with things, it somehow re- mains distinct, other, outside the referential system: "And moreover we shall say that this nature pervades all the forms, for each one is dif- ferent from the rest, not by virtue of its own nature, but because it partakes in the character of difference"2. This naming of existence by Plato in Derridean terms as a diverted presentation irreducibly witheld is not unique to the Sophist. A similar model is operative in the Republic where Plato asserts that the Good, the foundation of things, is both the object of rational knowledge, and outside the system of Being and knowledge altogether'. This does not make it a thing-in-itself, or an absent neutrality. On
Research in Phenomenology – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1980
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