Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/brill/the-givenness-of-self-and-others-in-husserl-s-transcendental-oUF917bl4w
References
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © 1982 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 0047-2662
- eISSN
- 1569-1624
- DOI
- 10.1163/156916282X00127
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Husserl's explication of "self" and "others" occurs within his founding science of pure possibilities or "bracketed" consciousness and experience. His analysis of self and others seeks, in part, to demonstrate that "personal" or "self-experience" is not the only possibility of immanent consciousness but that "other persons" are also given as possibilities. The possibility of others, though in a form of givenness different from that of self, provides a basis for inter-subjectivity. Thus, Husserl's phenomenological analysis can, if it does avoid solipsism and subjective idealism in general, establish inter-subjectivity as coextensive with subjectivity within the deepest possibilities of experience. Husserl's discussion of how the other as an external person or alien ego occurs as a given after all beliefs in an independently existing world are suspended (bracketed) shares some interesting parallels with psychological concepts and also suggests foundational possibilities for research on how the other is constituted as a separate "person" within our consciousness.</jats:p> </jats:sec>
Journal
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1982