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Emotion as the Transformation of World

Emotion as the Transformation of World 180 EMOTION AS THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORLD Robert L. Hall and Virginia E. Cobey Emotional Consciousness It is no secret that emotion has always created problems for psychology. Definitions of emotion abound in the literature (e.g., Hillman, 1964; Strongman, 1973). Basic to this problem of definition is the inherent difficulty in isolating emotional phenomena. According to Duffy (1962) there is no adequate definition of emotion which describes a state or response pattern which is qualitatively distinguishable from any other state or response pattern. Emotions are not "things," and since we are used to thinking in terms of "things" rather than "pro- cesses," they pose special problems. Indeed so great is the diffi- culty in conceptualizing emotions that Goldstein (1940) wanted to exclude them from consciousness altogether. In formulating his position concerning the relationship of emotion to con- sciousness, Goldstein concluded that emotions are not, strictly speaking, conscious although they are experiences of which we are aware. He argues that when emotions are objectified, they lose their specific character - they become objects which they are not (no-thing). The notion that emotion cannot be adequately conceptual- ized as a "thing" is reflected in Sartre's depiction of emotion as the transformation http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Phenomenological Psychology Brill

Emotion as the Transformation of World

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0047-2662
eISSN
1569-1624
DOI
10.1163/156916276x00061
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

180 EMOTION AS THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORLD Robert L. Hall and Virginia E. Cobey Emotional Consciousness It is no secret that emotion has always created problems for psychology. Definitions of emotion abound in the literature (e.g., Hillman, 1964; Strongman, 1973). Basic to this problem of definition is the inherent difficulty in isolating emotional phenomena. According to Duffy (1962) there is no adequate definition of emotion which describes a state or response pattern which is qualitatively distinguishable from any other state or response pattern. Emotions are not "things," and since we are used to thinking in terms of "things" rather than "pro- cesses," they pose special problems. Indeed so great is the diffi- culty in conceptualizing emotions that Goldstein (1940) wanted to exclude them from consciousness altogether. In formulating his position concerning the relationship of emotion to con- sciousness, Goldstein concluded that emotions are not, strictly speaking, conscious although they are experiences of which we are aware. He argues that when emotions are objectified, they lose their specific character - they become objects which they are not (no-thing). The notion that emotion cannot be adequately conceptual- ized as a "thing" is reflected in Sartre's depiction of emotion as the transformation

Journal

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1976

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