Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

A receiver–signaler equilibrium in the evolution of communication in noise

A receiver–signaler equilibrium in the evolution of communication in noise Behaviour 150 (2013) 957–993 brill.com/beh Review A receiver–signaler equilibrium in the evolution of communication in noise R. Haven Wiley ∗ Department of Biology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27510, USA * E-mail address: rhwiley@email.unc.edu Accepted 30 January 2013 Abstract Communication in noise differs in a fundamental way from communication without noise, because a receiver faces four possible outcomes every time it checks its input. These outcomes present inevitable trade-offs for a receiver in adjusting its threshold for response. A signaler also faces trade-offs, in this case between costs and benefits as the exaggeration of signals increases. Fur- thermore, a receiver’s and signaler’s performances are mutually interdependent. The utility of a receiver’s threshold depends on the signaler’s exaggeration (the level of the signal in relation to the level of noise), and the utility of a signaler’s exaggeration depends on the receiver’s threshold. Diminishing returns for both receiver and signaler suggest the possibility of a joint evolutionary equilibrium for a receiver’s threshold and a signaler’s exaggeration. The present analysis combines previous expressions for the utility of a receiver’s threshold ( U r ) and the utility of a signaler’s ex- aggeration ( U s ) in order to explore http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Behaviour Brill

A receiver–signaler equilibrium in the evolution of communication in noise

Behaviour , Volume 150 (9-10): 37 – Jan 1, 2013

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/a-receiver-signaler-equilibrium-in-the-evolution-of-communication-in-V0W8QkxqpJ

References (26)

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0005-7959
eISSN
1568-539X
DOI
10.1163/1568539x-00003063
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Behaviour 150 (2013) 957–993 brill.com/beh Review A receiver–signaler equilibrium in the evolution of communication in noise R. Haven Wiley ∗ Department of Biology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27510, USA * E-mail address: rhwiley@email.unc.edu Accepted 30 January 2013 Abstract Communication in noise differs in a fundamental way from communication without noise, because a receiver faces four possible outcomes every time it checks its input. These outcomes present inevitable trade-offs for a receiver in adjusting its threshold for response. A signaler also faces trade-offs, in this case between costs and benefits as the exaggeration of signals increases. Fur- thermore, a receiver’s and signaler’s performances are mutually interdependent. The utility of a receiver’s threshold depends on the signaler’s exaggeration (the level of the signal in relation to the level of noise), and the utility of a signaler’s exaggeration depends on the receiver’s threshold. Diminishing returns for both receiver and signaler suggest the possibility of a joint evolutionary equilibrium for a receiver’s threshold and a signaler’s exaggeration. The present analysis combines previous expressions for the utility of a receiver’s threshold ( U r ) and the utility of a signaler’s ex- aggeration ( U s ) in order to explore

Journal

BehaviourBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2013

There are no references for this article.