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God is not in the Mirror

God is not in the Mirror COMMENTARIES God is not in the Mirror J ESSE M. B ERING ¤ In response to my paper on possible phylogenetic divergence in the case of theistic percepts, Gallup and Maser argue that an alternative — and more heuristic — approach to studying religious phenomena can be found in neuroanatomical mapping of cognitive functions that seem to play some role in this category of thought. On the one hand, the argument is sound and will probably come to be prescient; cognitive neuroscience should begin to emerge as an increasingly important player in the newly overlapping Ž elds of cognition and comparative religion. Indeed, initial strides have already been taken in just this area (Shaver & Rabin 1997). But on the other hand, it is somewhat misguided in that it implies that neurological methods are alternative rather than complementary ways to go about seriously studying the cognitive foundations of religion. The representational systems outlined in my article are inherently brain-based, and there is, as Gallup and Maser point out, reason to assume some degree of localization of the general aspects associated with them. Until comparative neuropsychologists are able to discern the seemingly subtle differences in the brains of humans and http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Cognition and Culture Brill

God is not in the Mirror

Journal of Cognition and Culture , Volume 1 (2): 5 – Jan 1, 2001

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References (14)

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1567-7095
eISSN
1568-5373
DOI
10.1163/156853701316931425
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

COMMENTARIES God is not in the Mirror J ESSE M. B ERING ¤ In response to my paper on possible phylogenetic divergence in the case of theistic percepts, Gallup and Maser argue that an alternative — and more heuristic — approach to studying religious phenomena can be found in neuroanatomical mapping of cognitive functions that seem to play some role in this category of thought. On the one hand, the argument is sound and will probably come to be prescient; cognitive neuroscience should begin to emerge as an increasingly important player in the newly overlapping Ž elds of cognition and comparative religion. Indeed, initial strides have already been taken in just this area (Shaver & Rabin 1997). But on the other hand, it is somewhat misguided in that it implies that neurological methods are alternative rather than complementary ways to go about seriously studying the cognitive foundations of religion. The representational systems outlined in my article are inherently brain-based, and there is, as Gallup and Maser point out, reason to assume some degree of localization of the general aspects associated with them. Until comparative neuropsychologists are able to discern the seemingly subtle differences in the brains of humans and

Journal

Journal of Cognition and CultureBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2001

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